Interview : Kenneth Rogoff by Aaron Steelman
RF: How does the IMF’s role differ from the
World Bank’s?
Rogoff: The two organizations are quite similar
in some ways. They are both, broadly speaking,
United Nations (U.N.) family institutions. But
they have different voting structures than the
U.N. Votes in the IMF and the World Bank are
loosely weighted by size of economic contribu-
tion to the global economy, so that the European
countries, Japan, and the United States have a
disproportionately large vote. The IMF and the
World Bank also have interlocking boards of
directors, so some people sit on both boards.
As for how they differ, the IMF is charged
with trying to promote global financial stability
and growth, while the World Bank directs its
efforts at alleviating poverty. The IMF provides
support to the World Bank in working toward
that goal, but that is not our primary mission.
Importantly, the IMF is only allowed to lend to
sovereigns, whereas the World Bank does not
face any such restriction. It is also worth noting
that the World Bank is also much larger in terms
of staff and budget than the IMF.
So what does it mean, in practice, to
“promote global financial stability”? Part of what
we do is constantly loan paid-in capital to emerg-
ing markets and developing countries. For
instance, in the 1990s we made some large loans
to South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, and
more recently we have loaned to Argentina,
Brazil, and Turkey. But there are also many
smaller loans out there. It’s not unusual for us
to have so-called “programs” going in 30 or 40
countries at one time. The important issue we
look at in assessing the size and structure of a
program is whether an individual country’s prob-
lems might pose systemic risks to the global
financial system. 
Such lending is the headline activity of the
IMF, but there is also another big element to
what the IMF does. We provide a forum for
countries to meet and provide information—both
formally and informally—to one another. This
allows policymakers to exchange ideas about best
practices during noncrisis periods. In fact, many
of our staff papers deal not with crisis issues but
instead with more general macroeconomic issues.
Finally, of course, every member country must
submit themselves to bilateral review of their eco-
nomic policies every year or two.
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was founded
in 1945, along with its sister institution, the World
Bank, in an effort to stabilize the international eco-
nomic order. In recent years, the IMF has come under
intense scrutiny from a wide range of sources. It has
been the target of anti-globalization activists, who have
taken to the streets to protest the organization’s poli-
cies, and of the Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph
Stiglitz, who has taken the IMF to task on a panoply of
issues in his book Globalization and Its Discontents.
In August 2001, Kenneth Rogoff took a two-year leave of
absence from Harvard University to become the chief
economist at the IMF. (He will rejoin the Harvard faculty
in the fall of 2003.) During his academic career and earlier
stints with the IMF and the Federal Reserve’s Board of
Governors, Rogoff established himself as an expert on
international finance, debt, and monetary issues. His 
1985 article for the Quarterly Journal of Economics, “The
Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate
Monetary Target,” spawned a vast literature on central
bank design. And his textbook, Foundations of Interna-
tional Macroeconomics, co-authored with Maurice
Obstfeld, is widely used in graduate classes.
Rogoff is also an expert chess player, obtaining the life-
time title of International Grandmaster (the highest
rank awarded by the World Chess Federation) in 1978.
He retired from tournament competition at the age of
25 to focus on his economic research. Aaron Steelman
interviewed Rogoff at the IMF’s headquarters in
Washington, D.C., on April 15, 2003.
Kenneth
RogoffRF: When you came to the IMF,
were there certain economic issues
that you thought should be the focus
of your department’s research?
Rogoff: I think it’s very important,
when coming to a job like this, to have
an open mind and to realize that some
of the best ideas come from the
bottom up. You have to really listen
to people and to give people room to
be creative. But, yes, there are some
specific issues that I wanted us to
work on, such as exchange rates for
developing countries. Before I came
to the IMF, I had done a lot of work
on industrialized countries but I had
never really worked on low-income
countries, and it quickly became
apparent that they have many inter-
esting special problems. For instance,
the amounts of international aid going
to poor countries are very large as a
percentage of their overall budgets—
we’re sometimes talking 10 or 20
percent. How do you manage this macroeco-
nomically? Also, consider Africa. Many of those
countries are subject to huge commodity price
shocks. How do you conduct monetary policy
when your main export—which produces, say, 80
percent of your country’s income—can vary up or
down by more than 40 percent? These are very
interesting questions that just never would have
occurred to me if I hadn’t come here.
We are also interested, of course, in the inter-
national financial architecture and all that entails:
capital controls, the international bankruptcy
court, and other issues. And I’m very interested
in new open-economy macroeconomics, an inter-
est that grows out of my work with Maury Obst-
feld. When I came here, the Fund had a model
that was, I think, very effective at looking at what
occurs if there is an oil or global productivity
shock. But the model was 20 or 25 years old, so I
wanted to replace it with a newer model, and we
have made a lot of progress in that direction. I
must say, though, that much of what we have been
able to accomplish is because other places—such
as the European Central Bank and the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York—have been refining
their own models. Not surprisingly, I would say
that most of the work we do has more of an
empirical, policy bent than you would see at a uni-
versity seminar series. 
RF: The IMF has been attacked from all sides:
from the left for pushing “neo-liberal” policies
in developing countries, and from the right for
creating moral hazard problems as a result of its
lending. How would you respond to such critics?
Rogoff: The most important thing for us to do,
and it’s the honest truth, is not to respond to the
critics but to listen to them. Indeed, broadly
speaking, the IMF and the World Bank are quite
receptive to criticism and have made some serious
changes over time. In 1980, for instance, the
World Bank was not in favor of free trade. Simi-
larly, the IMF was much more Keynesian 25 years
ago than it is today. It’s not easy for these insti-
tutions to move quickly—you need to achieve con-
sensus among a large number of board members,
some of which represent a large number of coun-
tries—but the critics have made a difference. 
The second thing that I want to say is that
almost everyone in academia has some criticisms
of the World Bank and the IMF. I sure did. I























countries.wrote some of the first papers on moral hazard
and IMF lending in the late 1980s with Jeremy
Bulow. We took a fairly cynical view of the whole
process. I also wrote a paper with Maury Obst-
feld called “The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates”
that said it was a disaster to support fixed
exchange rates, which was conventional wisdom
at the time. This view, which has now by and large
become the conventional one, is an example of
why one has to resist always trying to come down
somewhere in the middle on debates, which is a
natural tendency in an institution like this. 
RF: It’s pretty surprising that 25 years ago free
trade would have been a controversial idea at
the World Bank or IMF, since liberal trade poli-
cies were so widely accepted by the profession
as a whole.
Rogoff: You have to understand that the institu-
tions are governed by their member states. A lot
of countries will say that if you look at the history
of the industrialized world, many countries have
had protectionist policies. Even today, the United
States and the European Union
remain quite protectionist in some
areas, albeit far less than most
developing countries. I think that
is very unfortunate. It strengthens
the hand of protectionists in
developing countries who say,
“Look—today’s rich countries got
that way by using protectionist
policies. Why are you so sure that
we should reduce our trade barri-
ers? Shouldn’t we protect our
infant industries?” So, the free
trade position, which economists
will say is obviously correct, will
not be so obvious to some of the
people from our member states.
This is a good example where the
middle ground was not right. Free
trade was, in many ways, the
radical position 25 years ago, even
though it was right. And I think
that some of the people who still
remain skeptical of liberal trade
policies are coming to the realiza-
tion that globalization is some-
thing that you can’t really stop.
RF: Your open letter to Joe Stiglitz drew a lot
of attention from economists, but may not be
as familiar to others. Could you briefly
describe what you had to say in response to
the criticisms he has made of the IMF?
Rogoff: I think that it’s a very passionate and
angry book, which is part of its effectiveness. It
is directed at a broad audience and it clearly hits
a chord with many people. Certainly if you asked
professional economists if they agreed with some
of the arguments in the book, they would say yes.
It covers a laundry list of problems with the IMF,
from the left, from the center, from the right,
from outer space. And as Jagdish Bhagwati said
in his review, if you launch enough missiles, you’re
bound to hit some targets. In that regard, I would
highlight the issue of premature financial liberal-
ization being something that one wants to be very
wary about. I certainly agree with Joe on that,
though I also think that if Asian countries had
genuinely flexible exchange rates in the 1990s, we
might have only seen a mini-Asian crisis instead
of a full-blown one. And Stiglitz’s book agrees with
the general proposition of having an international
bankruptcy court, an idea the IMF has advanced
over the past couple of years. 
But there are some areas where I think he takes
very odd positions. For example, let’s say you have
a country in a severe debt crisis that has been cut
off by its lenders. Should the IMF criticize the
country for not engaging in countercyclical fiscal
policy? Or if a country’s exchange rate is under
attack, I don’t think it should respond to it by
printing more money.
In general, I have trouble summarizing my take
on the book, because it draws in everything
anyone has ever written. But, at the end of the
day, when you set aside the personal attacks on
the competence, intelligence, and moral charac-
ter of the IMF staff, there are clearly some well-
taken points in the book. 
RF: The IMF gets a lot of attention for its
efforts to help prevent and deal with crises. But
there are some very important issues that can’t
be characterized as crises, but which still prob-
ably lower the standards of living of millions of
people—such as Europe’s rigid labor market
policies. What sort of counsel can you provide
to member countries on these types of issues?
Rogoff: We have an analytical piece on that very
topic in the April 2003 issue of World Economic
Outlook. We ask what are the costs to Europe
because of its labor market institutions—and what
would be the gains if those institutions were
brought to U.S. levels? We use two different models
to look at those issues. We come up with estimates
that Euro-area unemployment would fall about 3
percent and output would be 10 percent higher if
those institutions were brought to U.S. levels. That
doesn’t prove that they should make these changes,










of framework.because there are transition costs and allocative
issues, not to mention some noneconomic con-
cerns that might affect Europe’s decisions.
We can present our analysis and try to create
a dialogue, but it’s really hard to do much more
than that. We don’t have much traction with
developed countries on these types of issues. It’s
also important to note that countries do look at
each other and notice when certain countries are
growing and they ask what it is that they are doing
correctly. That doesn’t mean that they will change
their policies overnight. But it can have an effect.
In the 1990s, certainly, I think countries looked
at the financial liberalization of the United States
and asked how they could follow that type of
framework. And they were much more affected
by this than by anything that the IMF might have
told them about the issue.
RF: What do you think are the prospects for
economic liberalization in the Middle East?
Rogoff: Growth in the Middle East has been very,
very poor. Per capita GDP over the past 20 years
in the Middle East region as a whole has fallen by
1.6 percent a year. It has been the worst perform-
ing region in the world—and this includes the oil
countries. There’s another chapter in the World
Economic Outlook that looks at how much higher
growth could be in the Middle East if institu-
tions—here we are talking about corruption, polit-
ical rights, and other related issues—were brought
into line with the world average, forget about the
industrialized average. It concludes that the Middle
East could see gigantic income changes.
The Middle Eastern countries have very large
public sectors with very large budget deficits. They
have very shallow banking systems. And they have
very serious issues with corruption. These are fun-
damental problems that need to be addressed.
There is a role for regulation and for govern-
ment intervention in certain areas, but most coun-
tries don’t have the balance right. They have too
much state involvement and state control. The
Middle East is a region where this is particularly
problematic. That said, we believe that such gov-
ernance issues have to be decided by the people
of these countries themselves. All we can really
do is provide technical analysis and demonstrate
that their economies are performing very poorly.
RF: In the 1980s, Japan was the envy of the rest
of the world. What has happened to its
economy?
Rogoff: Japan has a lot of banks that are not
fully functional, because they have a great deal
invested in real estate and equities. And, as we
know from Ben Bernanke’s work on the 1930s,
when the banking system goes awry, it’s very hard
to get it back into shape. Many cor-
porations are being supported by
banks which are themselves insolvent.
Banks are keeping these corporations
afloat when, in fact, they should be
folded. Also, Japan’s weak social safety
net doesn’t give them the ability to
absorb changes as well as the United
States can. Eventually, they will need
very deep restructuring of their
banking system. It’s going to be
painful, but until they do that, they
will not have growth.
Another big problem is deflation,
which is aggravating the problems that
the banks have. I think the Bank of
Japan should end deflation, and I think
that it would be very straightforward
to do it—they need to be more aggres-
sive with their monetary policy. Even
if they ended deflation, I recognize that
they would still have many problems.
But it still would be a big step forward.
Japan also has dire fiscal problems,
in part because they have run deficits
in an effort to try to jumpstart the
economy. And, moreover, they have an
even more urgent aging problem than
does the United States; Japan’s labor
force is already falling.
RF: Are there certain skills that you
acquired playing chess that have
helped you as an economist?
Rogoff: It’s hard to say. When I was
an academic I did a number of papers
that involved game theory. I find that
game theory comes very naturally to
me, whereas algebra is something I can
do, but I wouldn’t describe myself as
very facile with it. So I definitely think there is
some connection between my chess career and
my ability with game theory. Also, it’s certainly
true that, in my current position working on
policy issues, I find myself drawing on chess analo-
gies. That’s because, in chess, there is seldom a
“right” answer. You very much need to consider
what the other person is thinking. You’re not just
objectively looking at the board—you are trying
to understand the other person. And in a policy
environment, when you’re discussing a problem
or negotiating a program, you are doing much the
same thing.  RF
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Kenneth Rogoff
➤ Present Position
Economic Counsellor and Director of
the Research Department, International
Monetary Fund
➤ Previous Positions
Faculty appointments at Harvard
University and Princeton University;
Economist, International Monetary Fund;
Economist, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
➤ Education
B.A., Yale University (1975); Ph.D.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(1980)
➤ Selected Publications
Co-author, Foundations of International
Macroeconomics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1996); author or co-author of
numerous scholarly articles in such pub-
lications as the American Economic
Review, Journal of Political Economy,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal
of Monetary Economics, and Journal of
International Economics
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